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Introduction 
Part of the challenge to understanding ideas about linguistic entities in Early China (ca. 500 B.C.E. to 200 c.E.) is that even the term "language" is mislead-
ing.1 If by "language" we mean a single phenomenon that includes speech, ·names, 
and writing-that is, a structure or an abstraction that is manifest in speech and 
writing-then early Chinese writers were not talking about "language" even implic-
itly. I cannot avoid the term, however, at least not in my title, because I will be 
responding to arguments that take for granted that ideas about language in Early 
China spawned a crisis. The presumption of a language crisis serves as my hook, 
which helps me organize various scholars' ideas: I strive to argue for an accurate 
understanding of conceptions of speech and names in early Chinese texts, and the 
very notion that their presentation of "language" could foster a crisis presupposes 
erroneous conceptions. This much will become obvious as I approach the idea of 
language from an unusual angle: its interaction with human bodies. 
The interpretation of "language" in early Chinese texts that emerges from 
my investigation is distinctive. Here, the texts do not describe language in relation 
to a world of sensory experience and mental ideas; rather, early Chinese texts are 
repeatedly seen to create pairings of sounds and various visible things. In formulat-
ing my analysis of early Chinese ideas about "language," I resist the impulse to fit 
it into familiar constructions and instead attempt to account for such pairings by 
conceptualizing how things related to what we think of as language must have been 
understood in Early China. That is, by "language" in Early China, I mean sounds: 
speech (yan 1§) and names/naming (ming ~. $). Language in this sense is more 
like sounds that issue from the mouth and enter the ears. It is bodily utterances 
that are emitted and heard-not an abstraction. For some, to describe language as 
1. Hans-Georg Moeller succinctly articulates the difficulty of wanting to use the term "language" 
to describe what is discussed in early Chinese texts. "I am well aware that it is problematic to 
apply the term 'language philosophy' in its strict sense in regard to ancient Chinese philosophical 
reflections on 'forms and names' (xingming /f.;z't), speech (yan §"), writing (shu if), or literature 
(wen x:). Chinese philosophy did not operate with a general notion of 'language' subordinating 
those concepts and establishing a general and explicit discourse of 'language philosophy.'" Moeller, 
"Chinese Language Philosophy and Correlativism," 91. 
ix 
x / Introduction 
a "bodily practice" might conjure the idea of performance, but I have something 
different in mind. As I explain below, in early Chinese texts sounds that issue 
from the mouth are a matter of practice insofar as speech (yan §') is something 
that is habitual. Along with action and bodies, early Chinese texts present yan § 
as a target of self-cultivation. Physiologically speaking, yan originates from qi. It 
is an auditory expression of one's heartmind (xin iC,,).2 As such, it is within one's 
control. Thus, people can construct their yan by cultivating their aims, which pre-
cede it. They can also develop habits of yan that improve its virtue, in particular, 
by matching their yan to their deeds, thereby achieving a balance between that 
which is audible and that which is visible. That is, matching one's yan to one's 
actions is a form of matching aural and visual, which is an embodied virtue that 
is to be expected from a sage and from a virtuous person. Hence, when I refer to 
early Chinese language as a "bodily practice," I want to suggest not a performance 
but something more akin to a technology of the self. 
This bodily practice of "language" differs from more familiar ideas about speech 
acts in two specific ways. First, early Chinese texts do not discuss phenomena such 
as a spoken promise making something happen. But in certain contexts, names or 
naming (ming :ii,-$) has the power to make something the case. Unlike yan, which 
typically issues from inside a person, ming does not express the heartmind, and it 
is only indirectly an area for self-cultivation.3 A ruler's ming, however, resembles 
a speech act insofar as the authority to name-that is, to assign titles or issue 
decrees-makes something the case. Thus, dispensing titles and delivering com-
mands renders the ruler's ming a specific kind of utterance that "does things with 
words." Nevertheless, there is a fundamental disparity between a ruler's ming and 
more familiar understandings of speech acts. Unlike a speech "act," early Chinese 
texts do not describe this naming as an "action." From the perspective of aural/ 
visual polarities, an action is something else entirely-walking, sitting, standing, and 
moving. In an aural/visual polarity, what rulers say is audible and what they do is 
visible, but while a ruler's naming accomplishes the act of making a name refer to 
something, as I argue below, from the viewpoint of early Chinese texts, it does not 
thereby count as "doing." Instead, the naming functions as a complement to some-
thing visible, like treating the person differently or the person behaving differently. 
2. As a translation of xin ,e.,, I use the awkward but useful term "heartmind" to signal that the 
faculties of reason and emotion are not separate. In general, to facilitate reader-recognition of 
graphs that I discuss often, I gloss them using a single term when possible. The admittedly 
wooden translations that sometimes result serve my goal, which is to emphasize the way words 
and phrases are repeated. 
3. That is, while one can work on earning a name, ultimately it is up to others to repeat it. 
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In sum, in describing early Chinese "language" as a "bodily practice" in my 
title, I mean "language" only in the sense of speaking and naming. I call it "bodily" 
because it is not an abstraction. Paradigmatically, as I argue below, yan come out 
through the mouth, whereas ming enter the ears. Moreover, these sounds should 
correlate with visible actions or shapes. Finally, I characterize language as a bodily 
"practice" to emphasize that it is not detachable from its use in everyday experi­
ence. Speech is a habit to be cultivated. Names are earned when others take note 
of one's speech and action. 
My subtitle, "A Chinese Grammatology," alludes to the discussion in Jacques 
Derrida's Of Grammatology about the relationship between speech and writing in 
the Western philosophical tradition. In his remarks on how that relation has been 
framed through dichotomies such as reality/appearance and presence/absence, Der­
rida wonders whether Chinese theories of language do something different.4 With 
an aural/visual polarity as the frame for "language" in Early China, my response to 
Derrida's question is affirmative, although it entails rejecting most of his assump­
tions about the nature of Chinese language. 
Other scholars have recognized that early Chinese texts do not foreground 
dualisms like reality/appearance or one/many, nevertheless, these tenacious binaries 
resurface in different ways when scholars start to discuss what they take to be ideas 
about "language" in the texts they consider. While scholars' instincts that the texts 
do not feature those dualisms are correct, the dichotomies they identify in early 
Chinese ideas about "language" indicate that their ideas continue to be influenced 
by those Western philosophical dualisms, whereas the aural/visual polarities that I 
am offering are firmly grounded in early Chinese texts. The ears hear things like 
names, fame, speech, and music, whereas the eyes see things like walking, action, 
forms, shapes, colors, and patterns. Speech and writing inhabit opposing sides of 
this polarity. Furthermore, in terms of ontology, early Chinese texts do not draw a 
material/immaterial contrast; instead, they seem to depict a sensory world that is 
a spectrum of varying degrees of materiality ranging from visible condensed things 
to less condensed sounds. It seems that along this spectrum, the complementary 
relations of hearing and seeing extend to other forms of sensing. Thus, there might 
be something like a continuum of "visibles" and "touchables," on the one hand, 
and "audibles" and "smellables" on the other. The association between hearing and 
smelling may reflect the fact that the cavities of the ears and nose are similarly 
4. As I read it, Jacques Derrida's hope in Of Grammatology is that Chinese writing might serve
to "dislocat[e], through access to another system linking speech and writing, the founding
categories of language and the grammar of the [Western) episteme." Derrida, Of Grammatology,
92.
